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EMBEDDED BANKING SECURITY LEVEL INDEX AND AIMED
CONTROL TEMPLATE FOR BANKING SYSTEMS — IMPLEMENTATION
EVALUATION USING THE VROOM-YETTON-JAGO CONTINGENCY
MODEL
ION STANCU AND DANIEL RECE
Abstract. An embedded Banking Security Level Index (B-SLI) and Aimed Control (AC)
scheme for banking systems is proposed in this paper. In this design the B-SLI and AC anti
money laundering techniques are fused together and used in sequence to expose a threat and
subsequently ameliorate the security level of banking. The potential implementation of the B-
SLI/AC template is then evaluated using the Vroom-Yetton-Jago contingency model. Study
concludes that the B-SLI/AC scheme can be implemented as a focused collaborative eﬀort
that will increase the reporting entities willingness to commit to the anti money laundering
eﬀort. This approach draws on our previous research and it is part of the idei_822 project.
1. Introduction
In order to expose potential vulnerabilities and subsequently enhance the security level of
banking this article proposes a sequential fusion of two anti money laundering instruments: the
Banking Security Level Index (B-SLI) and Aimed Control (AC). The B-SLI is an indicator for
assessing the security of ﬁnancial circuits. It was created during the authors‘ previous research
in the idei_822 project ﬁnanced by CNCSIS. If a potential security threat is exposed using
the B-SLI, the design proposed in this paper calls for the immediate implementation of Aimed
Control (AC). Aimed control (or AC) is an order issued by the appropriate Supervisory Body
(or Regulator) requiring speciﬁc ﬁnancial institutions to lower the transaction report limits
for a period of time, thus enhancing the security level in the exposed reporting entity. The
potential implementation of the B-SLI/AC template is then evaluated using the Vroom-Yetton-
Jago contingency model. The Vroom-Yetton-Jago Model is employed as a useful framework
for identifying the best approach to implement the B-SLI/AC template. The results show that
the B-SLI/AC if implemented as a focused collaborative eﬀort will remove the communication
gaps between the Regulator and the Reporting entities. This will in turn improve the perceived
beneﬁt areas and increase the reporting entities‘ willingness to commit to the anti money
laundering eﬀort thus increasing the security of the ﬁnancial system.
2. Banking Security Level Index (B-SLI)
The B-SLI provides critical auxiliary judgment and decision support for anti-money launder-
ing service systems and is particularly tailored for the ﬁnancial services industry in Romania.
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Its creation is based on the opinion of ﬁnancial markets and banking professionals in the U.S.,
Bulgaria, Russia, Romania, Switzerland, Cyprus, Greece, Slovakia, and the UK.
The authors conducted a comprehensive survey during previous research (Stancu, Rece,
Iorgulescu, R˘ adu¸ t, Maftei, 2008). One hundred and ﬁve professionals of the international
ﬁnancial markets were interviewed on issues ranging from the legal to reporting requirements
and the eﬀectiveness of international institutions involved in the ﬁght against money laundering
and ﬁnancial crime. The preferred method for conducting the interviews was cold contact
via email or similar methods with the request of following a link to a questionnaire. The
questionnaire was designed based on research at the level of European and national institutions
closely involved with AML/CFC as well as personal interviews with ONPCSB members. The
survey was subsequently employed in the creation of a new instrument assessing the level of
banking security: the Banking Security Level Index (B-SLI).
The Banking security level index (B-SLI) evaluates the security degree of ﬁnancial circuits on
a scale of 0 to 100, level 0 representing the lowest level of security while 100 being the ideal level.
The B-SLI is based on own research at the level of European and national institutions closely
involved with Anti Money Laundering and Counter Financial Crime (AML/CFC) (Stancu,
Rece, Iorgulescu, R˘ adu¸ t, Maftei, 2008) as well as personal interviews with ONPCSB members.
The shortage of quantitative information on the subject matter means the secondary sources
used in the construction of the index are few and reside for the most part in the Yeandle,
Mainelli, Berendt and Healy study in 2005 and the PricewaterhouseCoopers analysis in 2004.
A very diverse set of opinions has been taken into account when arriving at the ﬁnal set of
criteria included in the index. This is thus the only index currently in existence that measures
the security of banking channels simultaneously using 13 evaluation criteria as follows:
I. 10 points are awarded for Money Laundering risk and Financial Crime legal adequacy.
II. It awards for up to 10 points for an appropriate level of punishment to the risk of money
laundering and Financial Crime.
III. It allows for up to 10 points for an appropriate level of reporting requirements to the
risk of money laundering and Financial Crime (ML/FC).
IV. It allows for up to 10 points for an adequate level of security of ﬁnancial and banking
systems to money laundering and Financial Crime risk.
V. Up to 10 points can be granted for a sectoral level of security that is appropriate to the
risk of money laundering and Financial Crime.
VI. It allows for up to 10 points for the eﬃciency of the involved institutions in detecting
these phenomena.
VII. It allows for up to 10 points for the eﬃciency of the involved institutions in stopping
these phenomena.
VIII. It allows for up to 10 points for sectoral eﬃciency of the methods, techniques and tools
used to prevent and combat ML/FC.
IX. It allows for up to 10 points for adapting the detection methods, detection techniques
and detection instruments used to the challenges of new Money Laundering Systems.
X. It allows for up to 10 points for adapting methods, techniques and tools used to combat
the new Money Laundering System.
XI. It drops up to 5 points for ineﬃciency in detecting the phenomena.
XII. It deducts up to 5 points for ineﬃciency in stopping these phenomena.
XIII. It drops up to 5 points for sector ineﬃciency of the methods, techniques and tools used
to prevent and combat Money Laundering and Financial crime.
The B-SLI calculation primarily focuses on the extent to which the security level of ﬁnancial
circuits is meeting the new challenges arising from money laundering and ﬁnancial crime. The
B-SLI is deployed mainly using a questionnaire applied at the desired level of the reporting
entities. The authors previously used the B-SLI to convey an overview of the actual status
of the organizing and the functioning of the institutions involved in deterring ﬁnancial crime
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research however, the aim is to ascertain the degree to which the B-SLI can be used together
with the Aimed Control (AC) in the targeting and augmenting the security of speciﬁc ﬁnancial
institutions.
3. Aimed Control (AC)
Aimed control is the second stage of the proposed B-SLI/AC technique. Aimed control (or
AC) is an order issued by the appropriate Supervisory Body (or Regulator) requiring speciﬁc
ﬁnancial institutions to lower the transaction report limits for a period of time, thus enhancing
the security level in the exposed reporting entity. The aimed control order is issued speciﬁcally
for the institutions marked as vulnerable in the B-SLI stage.
AC draws its inspiration from the New York Money Transmitter Geographic Targeting Order
(GTO). The order was in eﬀect in the 1996-1997 period and required 3500 agents to report
information about the senders and recipients of all cash purchased transmissions to Colombia
of $750 and more. The order caused a dramatic reduction in the amount of illicit funds moving
through the New York money transmitters and has demonstrated for the ﬁrst time that the
underground market does respond to regulatory and enforcement pressures (Kelly, 1997), a
success the authors hope to match and surpass with the B-SLI/AC method.
Though the AC and GTO methods share some similarities the AC has clear advantages.
AC represents a focused collaborative approach. AC will have higher perceived beneﬁta r e a s
particularly as a result of removing the communication gaps by involving the reporting entities
directly in the development and implementation stage of the method.
The authors’ previous research (Stancu, Rece, Iorgulescu, Maftei, Radut, 2008) has shown
that the success of the AML/CFC strategy and consequently the level of banking security
depend to a large extent on the reporting institutions’ commitment to the objective of im-
plementing the Anti-Money Laundering Strategy. Same research has shown that there are
communication gaps between the Regulators and the Reporting Entities mostly in the percep-
tions of costs / beneﬁts relations. This situation had posed diﬃculties in the implementation
of other AML/CFC measures and consequently generated a lower security of banking. It is
reasonable to consider that the removal of these gaps with the introduction of the B-SLI/AC
in collaborative manner will improve the eﬃciency of the competent authorities even without
an increase in the cost of the reporting requirements.
4. Evaluation of the B-SLI/AC using the Vroom-Yetton-Jago Contingency
Model
1
A good anti money laundering strategy evaluation process must consider also the imple-
mentation phase. There is no use to select good methods which cannot be implemented. The
Vroom-Yetton-Jago Decision Model (Vroom, Yetton, 1973, Vroom, Yagoo, 1988) provides a
useful framework for identifying the best regulatorship style to implement the B-SLI/AC tem-
plate. The model diﬀerentiates among ﬁve diﬀerent implementation styles: two authoritarian
(denoted AI and AII); two consultative: consultation with reporting entities individually (CI)
and consultation with reporting entities as a group (CII); and a group decision making (GII).
The possible implementations of the B-SLI/AC template considered are:
1. Autocratic I (AI): Completely autocratic. Regulator chooses AC implementation para-
meters
2 or makes the decision by itself using the information available at the present time.
2. Autocratic II (AII): Request speciﬁc information. Regulator obtains any necessary in-
formation from reporting entities, and then decides on the implementation parameters itself.
Regulator may or may not tell reporting entities the ﬁnal purpose of its questions or choose
1T h em o d e lc a na l s ob ef o u n du n d e rd i ﬀerent names: Vroom-Yetton-Jago, Vroom Yetton and Vroom-Jago
depending on the exact technique used.
2Maximum and minimum duration of the AC order, reporting interval for the AC order, relation between
the B-SLI vulnerability level and AC duration, relation between the vulnerability exposed by the B-SLI and the
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to give information about the AC parameters and the decisions it is working on. The input
provided by reporting entities is in direct response to the regulator’s request for special infor-
mation. Reporting entities do not play a role in the deﬁnition of the AC nor in generating or
evaluating its parameters.
3. Consultative I (CI):One-on-one discussion. Regulator shares the AC parameters with the
relevant reporting entities individually, getting their ideas and suggestions without bringing
them together as a group. Then the regulator makes its decision. This decision may or may
not reﬂect reporting entities’ inﬂuence.
4. Consultative II (CII): Group discussion. Regulator shares the AC parameters with re-
porting entities in group meetings. In these meetings the regulator obtains their ideas and
suggestions. Then it makes the decision which may or may not reﬂect reporting entities’ inﬂu-
ence.
5. Group (GII): Consensual group decision-making. Regulator shares the AC parameters
with team members/reporting entities as a group. Together reporting entities generate and
evaluate alternatives and attempt to reach agreement (i.e.,consensus) on key parameters. Reg-
ulator’s role is much like that of facilitator, coordinating the discussion, keeping it focused on
the problem and making sure that the critical issues are discussed. The Regulator can provide
the group with its information or ideas, not tr y i n gt o" p u s h "t h e mt oa d o p ti t sA Cp a r a m e -
ters and is willing to accept and implement any parameters which have the support of all the
Reporting Entities.
The implementation of the B-SLI/AC template was analyzed using the following criteria:
the level of quality requirement (QR), commitment requirement (CR), regulator’s information
(RI), parameter structure (ST), commitment probability (CP), goal congruence (GC), reporting
entities conﬂi c t( C O )a n ds u ﬃcient information (SI).
A Vroom-Yetton-Jago Contingency model in the shape of a decision tree model in which
eight yes/no questions that must be answered in order from 1 to 8 when moving across the tree
diagram from left to right was deployed. A combination of previous research and direct expert
answers were drawn upon to complete the decision tree:
1. Quality Requirement (QR):
Q: How important is the technical quality requirement of the B-SLI/AC model?
A: High (In-depth interviews with O.N.P.C.S.B. members)
2. Commitment Requirement (CR):
Q: How important is the Reporting Entities’ commitment to the decision?
A: High (Stancu, Rece, Iorgulescu, R˘ adu¸ t, Maftei, 2008)
3. Regulator’s Information (RI):
Q: Does the regulator have suﬃcient information to make a high quality decision on its own?
A: No (Rece, 2010)
4. Parameter Structure (ST):
Q: Are the parameters of the AC model well structured (e.g., deﬁned, clear, organized, time
limited, etc.)?
A: Yes (International scientiﬁc debate and team meetings with representatives of the Univer-
sity Paris Dauphine, University of Rome Sapienza, Maryland and St. Petersburg Universities)
5. Commitment Probability (CP):
Q: If the regulator were to make the decision by itself, is it reasonably certain that the
reporting entities would be committed to the decision?
A: No (Stancu, Rece, Iorgulescu, R˘ adu¸ t, Maftei, 2008)
6. Goal Congruence (GC):
Q: Do reporting entities share the organizational goals to be attained in solving the problem?
A: Yes (Yeandle, Mainelli, Berendt, Healy, 2005).
7. Reporting Entities conﬂict (CO):
Q: Is conﬂict among reporting entities over preferred solutions likely?
A: No (Stancu, Rece, Iorgulescu, R˘ adu¸ t, Maftei, 2008)EMBEDDED BANKING SECURITY LEVEL INDEX 81
8. Suﬃcient information (SI):
Q: Do reporting entities have suﬃcient information to make a high quality decision?
A: Yes (International scientiﬁc debate and team meetings with representatives of the Univer-
sity Paris Dauphine, University of Rome Sapienza, Maryland and St. Petersburg Universities)
Figure 1. Vroom-Yetton-Jago Model
3
The diagram above displays the Vroom-Yetton-Jago process used by the authors to select
the best regulatory style when implementing the B-SLI / AC model.
The black dots mark the path in selecting the best B-SLI/AC implementation method.
Because the quality requirements are high and also the commitment requirements are high
then the regulator can not choose AC implementation parameters alone using information that
is readily available. Consensual group decision-making is needed.
In developing a B-SLI/AC template the Regulator must consult the Reporting Entities at
least on the following parameters: software platform integration,
4 duration interval of the AC
order, minimum and maximum reporting levels set by the AC order, the relation between the B-
SLI vulnerability level and AC duration, the relation between the vulnerability exposed by the
B-SLI and the reporting requirements of the AC. Other parameters of the B-SLI/AC template
that can be proposed for consideration are: deviation on the turnover reporting limit, cash
deposits/customer /month reporting limit, cash withdrawal/customer/month red ﬂag limit,
sales in cash/month limit, deposits/withdrawal/year limit.
5. Conclusions
The authors set out to develop an embedded Banking Security Level Index (B-SLI) and
Aimed control (AC) scheme for banking systems. The authors used the B-SLI as an early
3Model Source: http://faculty.css.edu/dswenson/web/LEAD/vroom-yetton.html
4The possibility to embed the B-SLI/AC or AC within the software solution used, (NORKOM-ACTIMIZE,
SYLCAT, FIRCOSOFT B-SLI/AC integration options).82 ION STANCU AND DANIEL RECE
marker for assessing the security of ﬁnancial circuits. When potential security threats were
exposed using the B-SLI, the design pushed for immediate implementation of an Aimed Control
in order to enhance the security level in the exposed reporting entity. The Vroom-Yetton-Jago
Model was employed as a useful framework for identifying the best approach to implement a
B-SLI/AC template.
Results show that the Regulator should not make autocratic decisions when Reporting En-
tities acceptance is crucial for a successful outcome, and that there is a use in involving the
Reporting Entities in the parameter selection process. This is because the AML/CFC strategy
and consequently the level of banking security depends to a large extent on the reporting in-
stitutions commitment to the objective of implementing the Anti-Money Laundering Strategy
(Yeandle, Mainelli, Berendt, Healy, 2005), (Stancu, Rece, Iorgulescu, R˘ adu¸ t, Maftei, 2008).
A consensual group decision-making implementation of the B-SLI/AC is recommended, with
the parameters for consultation with the reporting entities being in the least: software integra-
tion options, duration interval of the AC order, minimum and maximum reporting levels set by
the AC order, the relation between the B-SLI vulnerability level and AC duration, the relation
between the vulnerability exposed by the B-SLI and the reporting requirements of the AC.
This focused collaborative approach will have higher perceived beneﬁt areas (Pricewater-
houseCoopers, 2004) particularly as a result of removing the communication gaps (Stancu,
Rece, Iorgulescu, Maftei, Radut, 2008). It is reasonable to consider that the removal of this
gaps with the introduction of the B-SLI/AC in collaborative manner will improve the eﬃciency
of the competent authorities even without an increase in the cost of the reporting requirements.
An ongoing iterative simulation on the eﬀects of the B-SLI/AC adoption (Rece, 2010) shows
that the mere inclusion in the national strategy of this vanguard component will generate imago-
logic beneﬁts and increase the attractiveness of the Romanian economy even if AC orders are
never issued. Further results show that the B-SLI/AC could provide the grounds for shifting
the National AML Strategy from a passive approach, consisting in the sheer implementation of
rules imposed from outside, to a National AML Strategy deﬁned based on internal needs.
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